some primate species consistently outperform others across different laboratory tasks (Deaner et al. 2006) . Among birds, corvids may also exhibit similar cross-context cognitive prowess, with evidence for remarkable abilities in memory, planning, rule learning, inferential reasoning, and aspects of physical and social cognition (Seed et al. 2009 ). One fruitful avenue of research may be to test the performance of wild individuals across batteries of tasks targeting different cognitive processes (cf. Isden et al. 2013) . Although it is difficult to generate straightforward predictions, such work may help elucidate the mechanistic structure of cognition (e.g., the extent to which general mechanisms explain individual performance across different tasks) and understand whether selection acts on cognitive mechanisms as discrete traits or part of an interrelated complex.
As Rowe and Healy (2014) remind us, it would be naive to suppose that individual cognitive performance will necessarily correlate positively with fitness. However, exploring the relationships between suites of cognitive measures and multiple fitness components may help build a picture of the costs and benefits of cognitive traits. We have argued that there is much to be learned from psychometrics, a branch of psychology specifically concerned with quantifying individual cognitive differences (Thornton et al. 2014) . In particular, psychometric tests aim to reduce the influence of noncognitive factors and generate continuous measures of cognitive performance. These tests typically specify clear criteria as to what constitutes a "correct" outcome, but apparent mistakes will also be informative, for example, in revealing individual differences in sampling strategies (Seed et al. 2012) . By uniting psychometric approaches with conceptual and methodological tools from behavioral ecology, we can start to hone in on trade-offs and understand whether and how selection acts on cognitive variation. As noted by Rowe and Healy (2014) , researchers in behavioral ecology are becoming increasingly aware of, and interested in, the fact that an animal's fitness is not just determined by its physical and physiological qualities but also by its cognitive abilities: a Rambo may be outsmarted by an Einstein. But although physical and physiological qualities are usually relatively straightforward to measure, an animal's cognitive abilities may require special conditions to be revealed and can only be measured indirectly. Rowe and Healy discuss a number of pitfalls and complications that may hinder the study of such abilities and call for a reflection on what it is that one wants to measure and how this is done. I fully agree and should like to add 3 points to underscore their important message.
PeRFoRmaNce aND coGNItIve vaRIabIlIty
First, in a way, Rowe and Healy are modest in their take-home message. They rightly state that individual variation in performance in cognitive tasks does not necessarily demonstrate variation in cognitive ability. However, I should like to add that absence of variability in performance need not demonstrate absence of individual variation in the cognitive ability that the test is supposed to measure. If it only shows that the problem can be solved, but not how, then a simple performance measure such as the number of trials to reach criterion, does not reveal much about the cognitive process involved. As an example, in the context of examining whether songbirds have the ability for learning "artificial grammar" rules, we (van Heijningen et al. 2013 ) asked the question whether zebra finches were able to distinguish sequences of song elements that were artificially arranged according to different rules. Among the birds that managed the task, subsequent tests with a variety of differently structured test stimuli revealed that individuals could differ substantially in how they discriminated the sequences (van Heijningen et al. 2013)-variation unrelated to the number of trials needed to reach the initial discrimination.
PeRsoNalItIes
My second point concerns the wider relevance of Rowe and Healy's message. Cognition is not the only property of an animal that is made up from a set of different components and which cannot be measured by just a single test. The arguments and reasoning of Rowe and Healy can also be applied to that other area in which behavioral ecologists sometimes use simple tests: that of animal "personalities" or "behavioral syndromes." The exploration in an open field test or the latency to approach a novel object are measures that can indicate something about the "boldness" of individuals, but here also the same types of problems arise: Is individual variation in a novel object test, even when repeated, really due to a difference in "boldness" and indicative of a whole set of other (untested) correlated traits? Or is the response to the specific novel object presented indicative for the response to all types of novel objects or is it due to some other, extraneous, factor linked to that particular object or tested individual? Hence, here also, using a single test is likely to be insufficient or even misleading to reliably characterize differences in "personality" (see also Dall and Griffith 2014) . This issue is particularly relevant as the increasing interest in the relation between variation in cognition and variation in personality types (Sih and Del Giudice 2012) requires reliable measurements of both properties.
a bRIGht FUtURe?
Finally, should behavioral ecologists now be put off by all the complications raised by Rowe and Healy (2014) and above? I hope not. On the contrary: there is an important reason why behavioral ecologists should be encouraged to study cognitive traits. Cognitive science is dominated by research on humans and their cognitive abilities, and many studies of animal cognition are inspired by the question whether or not a certain cognitive trait is present in nonhuman animals and how it compares to human abilities. This is a perfectly legitimate motivation for scientific research and it may reveal a lot about the cognitive abilities that animals may have as well as provide suggestions about the building blocks or evolutionary precursors from which human cognitive complexity may have arisen. However, it may result in a focus on whether a trait is present at the species level, ignoring the variation that may be present among individuals and the question why it is that the species under consideration shows the abilities and variation that it does. With their training and background, behavioral ecologists are particularly well suited to address exactly those questions. For instance, something that studies on personality differences have made clear is that, like differences in cognitive abilities, what is "better" may vary in time, space, and social context (e.g., Dingemanse et al. 2004; Boon et al. 2008) . As a consequence, variation in personality can be maintained within or between populations. With a more detailed and rigorous study of the variation in cognitive traits and their fitness benefits, we may anticipate that this also will show that at least part of its variation may be present because what is best depends on the context (see also Sih and Del Giudice 2012). It may raise the awareness among cognitive scientists that an average may obscure meaningful individual differences that may be very informative about the cognitive abilities of a species. Hence, to conclude, although behavioral ecology can benefit from paying more attention to the knowledge, questions, and methods of cognitive science, the same is true the other way around.
